India, Pakistan, and the Bomb by Ganguly Sumit; Kapur S. Paul;

Author:Ganguly, Sumit; Kapur, S. Paul;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science/International Relations/General
Publisher: Columbia University Press
Published: 2011-11-15T16:00:00+00:00

S. PAUL KAPUR

A number of observers suggest that recent improvements in Kashmir, and in broader Indo-Pakistani relations, have resulted from the pacifying effects of nuclear deterrence. V. R. Raghavan, for example, argues that “a peace process with Pakistan on Kashmir has commenced and will continue. The conflict stabilization and the future resolution of the dispute could well be attributed to deterrence operating in the region.”22 In truth, however, improvements in Indo-Pakistani relations have not resulted primarily from nuclear deterrence. The Pakistanis reduced their support for anti-Indian militancy for three main reasons. First, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the American government realized that Islamic terrorism was a global problem with direct implications for the United States’ own security. The Americans also decided that they needed Pakistan to serve as a leading partner in their new antiterror coalition. Thus, while the United States had previously turned a blind eye toward Pakistani support for militancy in South Asia, it was no longer willing to do so. In order to serve as an ally in the U.S. antiterrorism effort—thereby avoiding the United States’ wrath and enjoying its considerable financial largesse—the Pakistanis were obliged to reduce support for Islamic insurgents in Kashmir, in some cases going so far as to outlaw militant groups.23

Second, Pakistani cooperation with the United States alienated Islamic militant organizations, which branded Musharraf a traitor. These groups subsequently turned against the Pakistani government and attempted on multiple occasions to assassinate Musharraf.24 This led the government to take further measures against the militants, as a matter of self-preservation.

Third, Pakistan’s internal security situation has deteriorated badly, with militant groups challenging the central government for control in areas such as the Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The militants, in league with terror organizations such as al-Qaeda, have launched a wave of terrorist violence that has wreaked havoc not just on NWFP and FATA but also on major cities such as Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad. Terrorist attacks on noncombatant targets in Pakistan more than doubled between 2006 and 2007, and deaths from terrorist violence increased fourfold, with 1,335 people killed.25 In response, Pakistan has deployed roughly 100,000 troops to the tribal areas, where they have so far been largely ineffectual in quashing the militants.26 Islamabad views the situation as an existential threat to the Pakistani state, and the Gilani government announced that defeating the terrorists would be the top priority of its first hundred days in office.27 This struggle against internal threats has diverted Pakistani attention and resources from the Kashmir conflict and impeded Pakistan’s ability to pursue its low-intensity conflict strategy against India. As Gurmeet Kanwal argues, Pakistan is “unable to fight simultaneously on three fronts—a proxy war against India, the Al-Qaeda-Taliban combine in its North West Frontier Province and vicious internal instability.”28 As a result, the Pakistanis have been forced to scale back their involvement in militant operations against Indian Kashmir. Pakistan’s reduced support for anti-Indian militancy, then, is not primarily the product of nuclear deterrence.

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